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Abstract 
 
This thesis presents a coherent set of research contributions to the new discipline of 
computer forensis. It analyses emergence of computer forensis and defines challenges 
facing this discipline, carries forward research advances in conventional methodology, 
introduces novel approach to using virtual environments in forensis, and systemises the 
computer forensis body of knowledge leading to the establishment of tertiary curriculum. 
The emergence of computer forensis as a separate discipline of science was triggered by 
evolution and growth of computer crime. Computer technology reached a stage when a 
conventional, mechanistic approach to collecting and analysing data is insufficient: the 
existing methodology must be formalised, and embrace technologies and methods that 
will enable the inclusion of transient data and live systems analysis. Further work is 
crucial to incorporate advances in related disciplines like computer security and 
information systems audit, as well as developments in operating systems to make 
computer forensics issues inherent in their design. For example: it is proposed that 
some of the features offered by persistent systems could be built into conventional 
operating systems to make illicit activities easier to identify and analyse. 
The analysis of permanent data storage is fundamental to computer forensics practice. 
There is very little finalised, and a lot still to be discovered in the conventional computer 
forensics methodology. This thesis contributes to formalisation and improved integrity 
of forensic handling of data storage by: 
• formalising methods for data collection and analysis in NTFS (Microsoft file 
system) environment, 
• presenting safe methodology for handling data backups in order to avoid 
information loss where Alternate Data Streams (ADS) are present, 
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• formalising methods of hiding and extracting hidden and encrypted data. 
A significant contribution of this thesis is in the field of application of virtualisation, or 
simulation of the computer in the virtual environment created by the underlying 
hardware and software, to computer forensics practice. Computer systems are not easily 
analysed for forensic purpose, and it is demonstrated that virtualisation applied in 
computer forensics allows for more efficient and accurate identification and analysis of 
the evidence. A new method is proposed where two environments used in parallel can 
bring faster and verifiable results not dependent on proprietary, close source tools and 
may lead to gradual shift from commercial Windows software to open source software 
(OSS).  
The final contribution of this thesis is systemising the body of knowledge in computer 
forensics, which is a necessary condition for it to become an established discipline of 
science. This systemisation led to design and development of tertiary curriculum in 
computer forensics illustrated here with a case study of computer forensics major for 
Bachelor of Computer Science at University of Western Sydney. 
All genesis starts as an idea. A natural part of scientific research process is replacing 
previous assumptions, concepts, and practices with new ones which better approximate 
the truth. This thesis advances computer forensis body of knowledge in the areas which 
are crucial to further development of this discipline. 
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1 Introduction 
 
“Forensis” vs. “forensics”: 
The Latin word “forensis” [133] means: relating to the forum or a legal 
business conducted in public. It entered the English vocabulary in the 
17th century as the term “forensics”. 
The term “computer forensics” is singled out from a more general 
forensis category and represents a subset of that category [119]. The 
modern meaning of forensic is limited to the areas of legal and criminal 
investigations, where it refers to using a broad spectrum of sciences to 
answer questions of interest to the legal system [57]. 
Computer forensis is a new discipline of science, and not surprisingly its coming into 
being is hindered by the lack of unified theories, terminology, and professional 
standards. The emergence of computer forensics is closely coupled to slow development 
of calculating devices which rapidly accelerated in the second half of the 20th century 
when the first electronic computers were developed – see Figure 1.1. 
The first electronic computers were build in the mid 1940s [74], and rapid development 
of this technology was soon followed by various computer related crimes: the first 
prosecuted case was recorded in Texas, USA in 1966 [51]. Traditionally computer crime 
has been defined as “any criminal act committed via computer” [27], but soon a more detailed 
classification developed to distinguish between criminal acts where a computer was used 
as a tool, and acts where a computer or computer systems themselves were abused or 
misused [152]. 
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Figure 1-1 Emergence of Computing Machinery and Computer Forensics 
(time not to scale) 
 
For early investigators it became obvious that if findings were to be useful as court 
evidence they had to comply with the same rules as conventional investigations [115]. It 
also became apparent that computer crime had features justifying a separate field of 
knowledge or discipline, commonly known as ‘computer forensics’, which focuses on 
the gathering of evidence from computers and computer networks. Computer forensics 
is a multidisciplinary field of forensic science encompassing computer science, computer 
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engineering, and law, and it aims to solve, document, and enable prosecution of 
computer crime (see Appendix A p.45 1). 
At the time this thesis was written (mid-2009) the discipline of computer forensics was 
still in the process of emerging as a distinct body of knowledge. While the distinctive 
position of computer forensics might be generally accepted, its formal recognition as a 
field of forensic science has not yet eventuated. Even the terminology is not uniform: 
while the vast majority of professionals concerned with computer crime agree on the 
term ‘computer forensics’ it is not unusual to see different terms, for example ‘digital 
forensics’, the term which reflects a wider range of devices which may be used to store 
or transmit digital data (voice recorders, mobile phones, etc.) [78]. Occasionally the 
terminology used is misleading, for example ‘forensic computing’ [95], which is 
application of computer technology in forensis (for example to match fingerprint or 
DNA patterns).  
There are two main challenges facing the discipline of computer forensics in 2009 and 
beyond: better formalisation of the existing conventional methods, and better 
understanding and use of emerging technologies. Technological progress has brought 
not only changes in the nature of crime, but also changes in the ways in which crimes 
are committed. Child sexual abuse [88] and terrorism [90] are not new, but they are 
examples of very serious crimes that may now be supported by computer technology 
[55]. The technology advances very fast, and computer crime advances with it. 
Computer forensis and the law need to proceed even faster to be a step ahead of 
computer crime. The best way to address this challenge is by providing high quality 
                                                 
1 Important note on page numbering in appendices: all appendices are papers which were 
previously published, and they are paginated differently to this thesis. Thus each appendix page has 
two numbers: one as in the original publication, and the second one corresponding to the consecutive 
page of this thesis. The references to page numbers in this thesis correspond to the respective original 
paper pagination. For example Appendix A is a paper published on pages 43-59 of the Journal of 
Information Science & Technology JIST 5(3); thus a reference to the third page of the paper is quoted 
in the thesis as: “Appendix A p.45” 
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education, and thus creating a growing group of people with the knowledge and skills to 
further develop and practice this discipline professionally. 
Computer forensis is a new discipline of science, and formalising it is a process that 
takes dedicated effort from committed professionals willing to champion the new ideas. 
The body of research presented in this thesis contributes in a material way to the genesis 
and advancement of computer forensis. 
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Figure 2-1 Thesis Structure 
 
The body of this thesis is based on 15 publications which are included as Appendices A 
to O. These publications form a significant body of academic achievement within the 
discipline of computer forensis by contributing in a material way to its genesis and 
advancement. The thesis covers computer forensis emergence, development and trends, 
new discoveries and techniques in conventional methodology, application of 
virtualisation in forensis, and finally the design and development of computer forensics 
curricula at tertiary level. The thesis is organised into four main chapters: 
Chapter 3 (Computer Forensics as a Discipline of Science: Development and Trends),  
based on the research work presented in Appendices A to E, identifies a number of new 
areas in computer forensis, and presents results of international collaboration in 
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research projects exploring three of these areas: forensic acquisition of computer 
memory, user data persistence in memory, and commonalities of computer forensics 
with information security (IS) audit. 
Chapter 4 (Novel Approaches in Conventional Computer Forensics: File Systems),  
based on the research work presented in Appendices F to H, presents approaches and 
techniques enhancing the conventional computer forensics methodology. Formalised, 
forensically sound methods are described for data collection and analysis in NTFS (New 
Technology File System) and ADS (Alternate Data Streams), and extraction of EFS 
(Encrypted File System) files. 
Chapter 5 (Virtual Environments: New Technologies for Forensic Investigation), based 
on the research work presented in Appendices I to K, connects two apparently 
unrelated areas: the virtualisation (understood here as simulation of the computer in the 
virtual environment created by the underlying hardware and software) and forensis. The 
chapter discusses the mechanism of booting and analysing a forensic image in a virtual 
environment. Further it proposes a method of using virtualisation to build a parallel 
multi-operating system environment where two systems, conventional and virtual, are 
used independently in the analysis phase of computer forensics investigations. The 
methodology is further developed and formalised, and the conclusion is reached that the 
proposed approach leads to a gradual shift from closed source software tools to open 
source software (OSS) tools. 
Chapter 6 (Systemising the Computer Forensics Body of Knowledge: Tertiary 
Education), based on the research work presented in Appendices L to O, starts with the 
observation that a discipline of science must have a well defined, widely accepted and 
distinct body of knowledge which has to be sufficiently systemised to become a part of 
the tertiary curriculum. This in turn makes it possible to educate students, and create a 
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growing group of people who practice this discipline professionally and continue to 
strengthen its position. Unlike other fields of computer science, no guidelines or 
recommendations exist for computer forensics curricula, and the chapter presents how 
computer forensics curricula was designed, developed and implemented at tertiary level. 
The degree of authorship of Derek Bem in the papers included in the appendices has 
been declared in the section List of Appendices. 
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3 Computer Forensics as a Discipline of  Science: 
Development and Trends 
(the corresponding research work has been presented in Appendices A to E) 
We live in a society where virtually all records about individuals and organizations are 
stored and processed digitally on computer systems. Details of our business and private 
lives, what we do for entertainment, who are our friends, etc, are likely to be stored 
somewhere in electronic format [136]. This affects the foundations and all related 
mechanisms necessary for the 21st century global economy, government, business, 
banking, military, health, education, science, arts, and any other human pursuit [136]. 
Societies, businesses and individuals are becoming increasingly aware of this irreversible 
and prevailing phenomenon. 
As every individual’s and organization’s dependency on computer technology increases, 
so does their vulnerability to information security breaches. Cyber attackers have almost 
unlimited opportunities to misappropriate or corrupt data repositories owned by 
individuals and organisations, and often little physical effort or time is required to 
commit an act which may carry serious consequences [156] . Computer security aims to 
prevent such incidents, but no security measure, electronic or physical, is totally reliable. 
Absolute security does not exist; we are always dealing with a balance of probabilities 
and risks. At the same time organisations are reluctant to disclose security failures in the 
fear that bad publicity may be even more damaging to their business than the original 
security breach [32]. 
The discipline of computer forensics is one of Australia’s national research priorities, 
under the category Safeguarding Australia. The relevance of computer forensics is 
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further illustrated by a recent statement from US Federal Bureau of Investigations [53]: 
“over fifty percent of the cases FBI now opens involve a computer”. 
This chapter describes how the discipline of computer forensis emerged and evolved, 
and what are the current technical and organisational research directions. 
 
3.1 Historical Background 
Computers represent the fastest growing technology ever developed by humanity [41]. 
Unfortunately the rapid adoption of computers in all human activities was followed by 
various computer offences [60]. What makes computer crime unique is the apparent 
ease to commit an illegal act. One of the first research studies into computer ethics and 
crime was conducted in the mid-1960s by Donn Parker who noticed that: "when people 
entered the computer center they left their ethics at the door" [117]. Parker was also instrumental in 
assisting with one of the worlds first computer specific legal acts, Florida’s Computer 
Crime Act of 1978 [39], and he proposed the first detailed classification of a computer 
crime, suggesting four categories [116]: 
1. “a computer can be the object of a crime: when a computer is directly affected by a criminal act, 
2. a computer can be the subject of a crime: when a computer is an environment in which the crime 
is committed, 
3. a computer can be used as a tool for conducting or planning a crime, 
4. the symbol of a computer itself can be used to intimidate or deceive 2“. 
                                                 
2 As for example in: ‘you can trust this information, I obtained it from a friend who downloaded it 
from a secret FBI computer’. 
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The original classification has evolved over time, and today three main, non-trivial 
categories of computer crime are commonly accepted: criminal acts in which a 
computer is the object of the offence, the subject of the offence, or the tool for its 
commission [149]. A considerable amount of research literature into computer ethics 
[34] shows a disturbing property of the human psyche: people who would never 
consider committing a crime often do not have any scruples when a computer screen 
separates them from unethical or illegal activity [19]. Often illegal computer acts are 
committed by young people who see it as a socially acceptable, even a desirable activity 
which is elevating their peer status [147]. While teenage hackers are much easier to 
intercept than experienced, hardened criminals, prosecuting young offenders is difficult 
and may even bring the reverse effect of increasing their standing amongst friends [153]. 
In the late 1960s finding a specialist who knew how to handle computer crime was very 
difficult, but already groups of people known as “hackers” were using their technical 
knowledge and information gained by social engineering 3 to commit computer related 
criminal acts [93]. As incidents of high technology crime became more common, law 
enforcement bodies responded by establishing specialised laboratories and allocating 
additional personnel to fighting computer crime, the area which many see as “the hottest 
emerging field in law enforcement” [114]. 
In a rather unexpected development many early computer hackers gained the 
recognition of people who were their original targets, and in turn private enterprises and 
police forces used their services on many occasions to solve cases of computer crime, or 
to protect against future incidents [11]. One of the most noted examples is the world-
famous controversial computer hacker Kevin Mitnick,  who was arrested and convicted 
                                                 
3 The term “social engineering” when used in the field of computer security, computer forensics and 
hacking circles refers to manipulating people into divulging confidential information relating to 
computer system codes, system access, passwords, etc.  
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for computer hacking in 1995, and who is currently a well paid computer security 
consultant and author [103]. There are many similar cases where the services of 
computer specialists, or hobbyists with no formal qualifications and with an ethically 
questionable history of high technology related fraud were contracted by various 
organisations to help with handling security incidents [87]. 
In  the  early  days   computer  forensics  mainly  involved   collecting   evidence  from 
single systems; the volume of collected data was very low by today standards and the 
tools used were not specifically designed for the task [96]. While many good practices 
were established by people who handled computer crime evidence, no commonly 
agreed upon standards were developed. The U.S. Department of Justice published a 
series of guides relating to high technology crime, and those guides are considered to be 
the rules to follow when handling digital evidence [17]. Today most of the previously 
established rules are inadequate, and the major new challenge for the future of computer 
forensics is to modernise its methods and processes to maximise the yield of valuable 
evidence. The technology grows very fast, and formal documents often fail to address 
new technological developments. Less detailed and general descriptions of various 
procedures are not uncommon, for example one of the current U.S. Department of 
Justice guides [67] when referring to collecting data from computer storage advises to: 
"Acquire the subject evidence to the examiner's storage device using the appropriate software and 
hardware tools”. The term ‘appropriate’ is vague, and its interpretation has been left for an 
individual investigator to determine. 
The conventional approach developed in the early days of computer forensics history 
was to make an exact image (bit by bit copy) of the storage media from a seized 
computer using appropriate tools, and analyse the acquired image later [149]. While this 
practice was easy to formalise in the 1970s or 1980s when the storage device capacity 
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was measured in single or tens of Megabytes [106], it became increasingly difficult to 
implement where the capacities of storage increased. By mid-2009 many technological 
breakthroughs [15], the latest of them perpendicular recording of data on magnetic 
media [106],  caused a single hard disk capacity to reach 2TB with higher capacities on 
the horizon.  Large capacity drives create many practical issues: copying data is slow, the 
error rate per single device is higher [22], and searching for the evidence is slower [42]. 
To illustrate the problem: a single 1TB disk can digitally store all world literature 
produced in one year [77]. Online Internet storage and storage virtualisation became 
common and easily accessible allowing for data to be kept on systems which are 
physically at other locations, and can be accessed as if they were local [45].  New, 
physically small devices (for example USB flash drives) became common and very 
inexpensive, and new data acquiring methodologies have to be developed to handle 
their unique properties (see Appendix J p.1). 
In 2009 computer technology reached a stage when a conventional, mechanistic 
approach to collecting and analysing data was no longer sufficient. Computer forensics 
moved beyond the analysis of hard disk images, and older, conventional guides for 
computer crime responders [73] are no longer sufficient; they need to be updated to 
reflect technological progress. Because of complexity of acquiring and analysing 
computer related materials it is not unusual to see many people involved in the process 
at different stages. Large corporations typically prefer to handle high-technology 
incidents internally, and set up their own internal investigative units [83]. One of the 
main reasons for such costly solution is that unfortunately, as opposed to some other 
areas of forensis, there is no commonly accepted computer forensic certification, and 
thus no clear definition who is an expert [98].  
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3.2 Current Research Directions 
In the last decade we observed a process of connections being formed between 
computer science, technology, crime detection and security (see Appendix A p.45). 
Computer forensics research directions must embrace approaches that will address 
emerging technological and organisational challenges. The technical area which needs to 
be better understood and formalised relates to collecting and analysing transient (or 
non-permanent) data. The organisational challenge is the need to develop a common, 
hybrid methodology combining computer forensics and computer audit tools. 
 
3.2.1 Technical Example: Memory Forensics 
The conventional approach to computer forensics requires making a copy of the storage 
media to be later analysed on a separate computer [79]. While this process allows the 
investigator to demonstrate in the court of law that the evidence was retained in the 
original, unchanged state, all “live” data is lost when the computer is powered down. 
Lost volatile data is likely to be a part of or even the only evidence of an incident. 
The computer forensics methodology which was developed and formalised in the last 
decade mainly focused on the analysis of permanent data storage, largely omitting issues 
related to capturing volatile data and the content of physical memory. Today computer 
technology has reached a stage when a conventional, mechanistic approach to collecting 
and analysing data is no longer sufficient. Forensic investigation of physical memory can 
reveal unique facts about usage of a computer system not available elsewhere. Such data 
may contain clues regarding the recent use of a system that are not available anywhere 
else, and these clues may be crucial to successful prosecution [28]. 
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Criminals have become more sophisticated, and the tools to securely erase or hide 
information are nowadays readily available and easy to use.  Evidence of criminal 
activity kept in electronic form on non-volatile storage can be erased or hidden 
effectively and quickly [139]. The ability for investigators to obtain reliable information 
from live systems including contents of a computer’s memory may be critical, for 
example it may allow the prosecution to produce evidence of the offending material 
having been loaded into the computer’s memory at the same time when the accused was 
present on the premises, or it may allow investigators to capture evidence of terrorist 
communications [109]. 
Analysing a live system has certain disadvantages: observations can not be repeated (the 
investigator is largely a passive observer), as they are obtained within a certain time 
constraint, and they are always intrusive to some extent (see Appendix B p.131). 
Additionally it is difficult to eliminate the possibility that some crucial evidence 
remained hidden as a result of an undetected rootkit, which modified the system and 
blocked access to some utilities and processes without the knowledge of the investigator 
[148]. For a forensic investigation the analysis of a memory dump, or a memory 
snapshot, would be preferable. It would allow performing non-intrusive tests in a 
controlled laboratory environment, and to repeat the tests using different tools, thus 
leading to a very high level of confidence that the obtained results are correct. 
Assuming the capability to obtain a snapshot of memory, the next step in memory 
forensics, interpretation of content, also presents a whole range of unresolved issues 
[53]. One such issue is that all current operating systems use the buddy system [81] to 
manage physical memory, and the age of deallocated pages has no bearing on the time 
of subsequent reallocation [76]. 
26 
From a computer forensics point of view it is crucial to notice that an investigator can 
not directly or indirectly determine the age of copied memory pages. Thus any 
information extracted from memory can not be reliably dated: it may be relatively old, 
or it may be very recent. This presents a problem from a forensis point of view. As 
opposed to non-volatile data stored on magnetic media, pages in memory do not 
contain time stamps or any other direct information about their age. Research shows 
that the age distribution of these pages does not change significantly with the level of 
demand, and is surprisingly similar in modern Windows and Linux systems which 
preserve almost the same number of pages with user data (see Appendix C p.71).  
Another issue relating to memory forensics is that no tool analysing memory dumps 
currently exists which would fully satisfy computer forensics requirements. Such a tool 
should be able to recreate the state of the system by interpreting the content of allocated 
memory, identify and interpret the content of unallocated memory, and finally identify 
currently and recently opened files by analysing memory resident fragments of files (so 
called file cache).  While various native operating system tools exists, such as the Unix 
crash dump utility [140],  as well as third-party software tools for Windows memory 
dump analysis [126], they are all of limited value in recreating the state of the system, 
because the memory image they analyse is not guaranteed to be consistent.  Additionally 
none of these tools have any capability to analyse unallocated memory, which potentially 
contains information on past usage of the system, and none of them allow the 
identification and analyses of the file cache. 
Capturing the content of the physical memory dump suitable for computer forensics 
analysis itself presents a serious challenge. Many commercial and open source utilities 
appear to provide the capability of capturing memory contents, for example the 
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common and ubiquitous dd [125], however the results are always far from complete and 
unsatisfactory because of two main problems (see Appendix B p.131): 
1. Any software tool used for memory capture is itself loaded into the target 
system's memory when it executes, thus changing its contents. The memory 
dump happens in parallel with the execution of such a software tool, and the 
tool execution can not be isolated and excluded from the memory contents 
being captured. 
2. The passage of time issue: the memory snapshot can not be done 
instantaneously, thus it can not capture complete and unaltered contents of local 
memory. The memory dump takes place in parallel with the execution of a 
operating system [37]. As the memory image is being captured, it is also being 
changed by other parallel processes, and pointers from already captured memory 
may point to data that has changed before it was saved. Similarly, data created 
later in memory that has already been saved may result in dangling references or 
unreachable objects. The serial and dynamic nature of memory traversal and 
capture excludes the possibility of capturing one coherent status. Instead we 
capture a series of incoherent, separate states. 
There were various attempts to address the first issue. One of them was the hardware 
experimental device Tribble [36], a PCI 4 controller card which is based on the PCI bus 
capability to access memory directly using DMA (Direct Memory Access) [118] 5. 
However any method which requires special hardware to be installed prior to an 
incident in a computer is of very limited use to computer forensics. 
                                                 
4 Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus was introduced by Intel around 1993 for 
interconnecting chips, expansion boards, and processor/memory subsystems. 
5 DMA allows to access computer system memory directly for reading and writing without using 
central processing unit (CPU). 
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Recent research from Princeton University [9] demonstrates that when computer RAM 
memory modules are rapidly frozen and removed from the original computer, data 
stored in RAM will persists for several minutes [65]. This discovery may lead to 
acquiring contents of memory, but currently this research is at a very early experimental 
stage, and its possible future application in computer forensics is uncertain. 
The second issue, passage of time, has not been satisfactorily addressed by either 
software or hardware methods of memory acquisition. Taking a consistent image of 
memory can only be achieved if all system activity is stopped for the time required for 
the acquisition process to be completed. No current commercial operating system offers 
such functionality, however a “stop-the-world” approach is inherent to experimental 
orthogonally persistent operating systems, for example Napier88 [18] and other similar 
systems [20], [75]. Using techniques developed for such systems may lead to achieving a 
reliable technique to capture coherent status of memory contents. 
The method to achieve this is to design and implement additional functionality in the 
kernel of the operating system which would, on demand, capture the complete virtual 
memory image comprising physical memory and the content of the paging and swap 
areas, and then store the images on an external device for offline analysis and 
interpretation (see Appendix B p.133). The software would have to be part of the kernel 
of the operating system in order to gain access to the lowest levels of control, for 
example setting the interrupt priority levels and ability to execute privileged instructions 
[126], and when activated it would execute the memory acquisition code. Once a 
complete and coherent memory image is captured it represents complete information 
about the system state at the time of the dump. 
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3.2.2 Organisational Example: Information System Audit 
The Committee of National Security Systems (CNSS) defines an information system 
audit 6 as: “Independent review and examination of records and activities to assess the adequacy of 
system controls, to ensure compliance with established policies and operational procedures, and to 
recommend necessary changes in controls, policies, or procedures”. IS auditing and computer 
forensics interact with the same computing environment, yet they are usually considered 
to be two different disciplines with their own sets of tools and methodologies (see 
Appendix E p.110).  
Today computer forensics is no longer limited to examining data collected from storage 
media but also includes live systems and volatile data, thus making the distinction 
between IS auditing and computer forensics less clear [108]. IS audit materials often 
mention forensics in a restricted sense, only in the context when a security specialist 
recreates what had happened to the system during a security incident [43]. While such 
process may indeed be a part of computer forensics investigations, findings would not 
be court admissible unless the investigator adheres to proper forensics methodology. 
While both IS auditing and computer forensics have the same goal, IS auditors almost 
always work with live production systems which can not be stopped [157]. Looking at 
the five stages common to computer forensics and IS auditing, the following can be 
observed: 
1. Purpose and planning: an IS audit is preceded by clear definition of requested 
activities, rights and obligations of the auditor. Typically a charter of engagement 
letter restricts the auditor’s activities in certain areas. A computer forensics 
purpose is finding evidence of criminal activity, and adherence to security 
                                                 
6 Usually referred to as “IS audit”. 
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guidelines is of little relevance. A court order which requests forensics typically 
does not limit which areas of the system the investigator is allowed to analyse. 
2. Identification of potential sources of evidence: an IS auditor collects evidence 
from a much wider range of sources, which may include hard copies of various 
documents, written internal policies, etc. A computer forensics investigator is 
rarely asked to look at those additional sources. It is the court decision what to 
include as part of a total evidentiary material set, and if necessary the court may 
request other experts to look at the additional materials. 
3. Acquisition and preservation: IS auditing uses methods which are rarely 
forensically sound. One of the techniques used is penetration testing [151]7, 
which would be totally unacceptable for a computer forensic investigator, as it 
invasive and considerably changes the status of the computer system [21]. 
Another example is the use of write blockers during forensics acquisition [104]; 
these are very rarely used by IS auditors. 
4. Analysis: data collected by an IS auditor may be analysed by various tools, not 
specifically designed or approved for IS auditing, and generally there are no 
tools prescribed for IS auditing. In contrast computer forensics tools need to be 
carefully selected for the task, or the investigator must be prepared to prove in 
the court of law that a tool used is forensically sound. 
5. Presentation: the results of an IS audit are in the form of a report, which does 
not need to explain technological aspects of the investigations. A computer 
forensics presentation is required to explain relevant technological aspects of the 
                                                 
7 “Penetration testing is security testing in which evaluators attempt to circumvent the security 
features of a system based on their understanding of the system design and implementation. The 
purpose of penetration testing is to identify methods of gaining access to a system by using common 
tools and techniques used by attackers”. 
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discovery, it must be ready for the court of law presentation and scrutiny, it 
needs to comply with a series of rules or good practices guidelines, and finally it 
needs to include a comprehensive summary that is easy to understand by less 
technically oriented audience.  
With computer crime on the rise IS audit often leads to formal investigations which in 
turn may be used in the court of law [24]. Any IS audit should be seen as potentially 
leading to forensic investigation. Thus a need to develop hybrid methodology (see 
Appendix D p. 7) combining computer forensics and audit tools becomes more urgent. 
If such hybrid tools and methods for one field were developed with full awareness of 
the requirements of the other field, both the IS audit and computer forensics would 
benefit. Some methods used in IS auditing need to be invasive, for example penetration 
testing. These conflicting requirements could be easily reconciled by equipping software 
with two modes of operation: normal and forensic, the forensic mode preserving the 
original data unmodified. Some software tools already offer a similar approach, for 
example X-Ways WinHex [56] offers a selectable forensic mode which preserves 
analysed evidence unchanged. 
 
3.3 Summary of Contributions 
This chapter makes a significant contribution to strengthening the position of computer 
forensics as a discipline of science by presenting a comprehensive overview of its 
history, current research directions, and by analysing its future challenges (see Appendix 
A). Two areas crucial to further development of the discipline of computer forensis 
were identified by the initial research. The first one is technical, the second one 
isorganisational: 
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1. Memory forensics: forensic acquisition of memory (see Appendix B) and user 
data persistence in memory (see Appendix C), 
2. Information security (IS) audit (see Appendices D and E). 
The work presented in this chapter contributes significantly to memory forensics by 
developing a methodology to quantify how user data persists in physical computer 
memory (see Appendix C p.70). It was also proposed that some of the features offered 
by persistent systems could be built into conventional operating systems to make illicit 
activities easier to identify and analyse (see Appendix B p.133). A new technique has 
also been proposed for forensically sound acquisition of memory based on the 
persistence paradigm (see Appendix B p.134). 
International interdisciplinary cooperation with European IS security audit specialists led 
to the realisation that the separate disciplines of IS auditing and computer forensics 
investigation interact with the same computing environment (see Appendix E p.113). 
There are sufficiently many similarities between both fields to justify developing 
common methodologies and tools. Our research resulted in proposing a hybrid 
methodology combining computer forensics and audit tools, which ensures that the 
evidence found in the course of an IS audit conforms to audit requirements and is 
forensically sound (see Appendix D p.7). 
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4 Novel Approaches in Conventional Computer 
Forensics: File Systems 
(the corresponding research work has been presented in Appendices F to H) 
Conventional computer forensics is mostly concerned with retrieval and analysis of data 
from magnetic and optical permanent storage devices like hard disk drives, CD ROMs, 
etc.  The conventional approach is to make an image (bit by bit copy) of the storage 
media from a seized computer, and search it for relevant information. The methodology 
supporting this approach was developed and formalised in the early days of the 
computer forensics discipline,  and duplication as well as preservation of digital evidence 
is very well documented in literature [29]. While duplication of magnetic storage media 
is a relatively straightforward task [149], analysing the copied storage is not a process 
which can be fully automated and it requires skills at a high level and an in-depth 
understanding of file system structures – see Figure 4.1. Acquiring this expertise is not 
easy: literature is often obsolete and covers only file organization principles and 
algorithms [142].  
Each file system is based on a different design philosophy and uses different internal 
structures, so it is not possible to develop one methodology which could be applied to 
all file system structures. What follows is that a computer forensics investigator requires 
a detailed understanding of the internal operation of a file system being analysed. When 
a new file system is introduced, specific information about how it is built and organised 
is needed immediately. In 1988 Microsoft embarked on a large project to create a 
completely new family of operating systems [48] with a new file system architecture. The 
first commercial product was released in 1993 as Windows NT 3.1, and all subsequent 
releases including the most recent, Windows 7, are based on the original NT code base. 
As part of the project the aging FAT (File Allocation Table) file system architecture 
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designed in the late 1970s was replaced by NTFS (New Technology File System, or NT 
File System) which since then became the native file system format for all versions of 
Windows. 
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Figure 4-1 Computer Forensis Methodology and Processes 
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NTFS is advanced and complex, and out of all file systems currently in use it is by far 
the most widely used in both home and commercial environments. Yet its detailed 
structure and operation has not been released into the public domain by Microsoft. 
There is still a lot to be discovered in the conventional computer forensics 
methodologies as applied to investigations of NTFS file structures. 
 
4.1 Investigating NTFS File System Images 
In the early 1990s, soon after Windows NT was introduced, Microsoft published a 
series of books explaining the system’s operation, but none of them fully documented 
the internals. For example the book “Inside the Windows NT File System” [47] released 
in 1994 by Microsoft Press offered a good conceptual description for users and 
administrators, but it lacked technical depth and details. This lack of depth in the 
documentation created problems in two areas: interoperability with the Linux family of 
systems and computer forensics investigations. 
In a network environment computers running different operating systems must be able 
to read and write files between different machines, and Linux based systems require the 
capability to read and write Windows NTFS files [70]. In a non-network environment it 
is common to see a single computer in multi-boot configuration with Linux and 
Windows installed, and again cross platform file compatibility is highly desirable. 
Various Linux related projects focused on reverse engineering the NTFS structure. This 
resulted in publishing comprehensive NT system level documentation and the release of 
various tools [127]. In 2003 one of these projects, Captive [84], resulted in developing 
the first stable Linux read/write access to NTFS disk drives. Similar solutions soon 
followed, and today the most commonly used read/write NTFS driver for Linux is 
NTFS-3G [7]. 
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The work of the Linux community concentrated on providing a Linux – NTFS 
interface, and it greatly contributed to a better understanding of the NT internals. 
However this work did not address the needs of computer forensics experts: it did not 
provide specifics about how to analyse images of the NTFS file systems, and it did not 
analyse various aspects of data hiding in the unique NTFS file system data structures. 
Understanding how information can be hidden in the file system and how to discover 
and extract it is one of the main tasks in computer forensics [12] – see Figure 4.1. 
Typically when analysing computer system structures [89] one would expect to find 
some empty, unused fields reserved for future use or fields left unused for clarity of 
design 8. Both of those reasons for leaving the gaps are common, and create a basis for 
hiding information. Only some methods are effective in the long term, and thus of 
interest for computer forensics. Criteria for those methods are described by Provos and 
Honeyman [122]: 
• No errors should be returned by standard system tools 9 (this necessitates the 
development of special tools for the computer forensics field). 
• Probability of hidden data being overwritten during normal system operation 
should be very low. 
• Hidden data can not be revealed using standard system GUI tools 10 (again, a 
computer forensic analyst needs access to special tools). 
                                                 
8 For example a byte (16 bits) may be allocated to map certain system conditions, but only 4 such 
conditions are allowed. For clarity the remaining 12 bits of the byte are left unallocated, as opposed to 
allocating them to map different, logically unconnected system conditions. 
9 For example chkdsk utility. 
10 For example Windows Explorer. 
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• A reasonable amount of data can be hidden 11 (the trivial case of a user hiding a very 
small amount of information, for example a single character, is trivial and of no practical 
interest to computer forensics). 
 In NTFS every object is a file which includes metadata 12 with relatively complex 
structures [110]. The most important structure of an NTFS volume is the Master File 
Table (MFT) implemented as an array of records (also called attributes) [126]. The 
structure of MFT creates a possibility for effective, non-trivial methods of hiding data in 
$DATA, $BadClus attributes and $Boot file (see Appendix F p.212). Moreover NTFS is 
not sensitive to certain changes within the metadata structures, and does not warn if a 
file has additional attributes which are not necessary [35], thus increasing effectiveness 
of data hiding. 
 
4.2 Investigating NTFS File System Backups for Hidden Data 
The NTFS file system metadata structure $DATA attribute provides the greatest scope 
for effective data hiding. This attribute supports a unique feature introduced by NTFS: 
Alternate Data Streams (ADS 13). The main motivation for introducing ADS in the early 
1990s (see Appendix G p.449) was to provide better interoperability between Windows 
NT servers and Macintosh clients [134] which were using Hierarchical File System 
(HFS) to access Windows NT Resources [63]. There are also other uses of ADS: they 
can provide additional descriptions for files and folders which may include subject, 
author, keywords, descriptive comments, thumbnail previews of images, etc. Each 
                                                 
11 It is always possible to effectively hide a very small amount of data (for example a single character) 
within any operating system structure. 
12 Metadata defines the structure of the file system itself and may provide additional information 
relating to the file, for example ownership, protection, timestamps or descriptive comments. 
13 Microsoft also uses the acronym “ADS” in the same Windows environment in relation to 
Automated Deployment Services, with no connection to Alternate Data Streams. 
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Master File Table (MFT) record representing one file can have one or more $DATA 
attributes; the additional $DATA attributes are known as alternate data streams. Many 
basic, simple to use utilities exist which allow users to embed a file as an ADS of 
another file, thus effectively hiding it from common system utilities [33]. 
A computer forensics investigator needs to be aware of the mechanism of hiding 
information within ADS, and methods to search for such hidden data. While there are 
utilities which allow finding and extracting ADS, none of them is able to distinguish 
between the ADS used for legitimate purposes and the ADS used to hide information, 
thus they require the analysis of a huge volume of largely irrelevant data. 
 Forensic acquisition of storage devices involves making an exact, bit by bit copy of the 
original media using one of many, often free, imaging tools [125]. A forensic copy 
contains exactly the same data as the original [112]. File system backup software [50] is 
usually not considered to be a forensically sound tool, as typically it does not produce a 
true, bit by bit copy of the source. While some backup tools provide the option to 
create a full hard disk image to allow a so called “bare metal restore” to a new, empty 
disk, compliance of such software with forensics requirements can never be guaranteed, 
and would have to be verified [143]. There may be circumstances where system backups 
are used as additional sources of evidence and an investigator needs to understand the 
peculiarities of the specific software which was used to create the backup files being 
analysed. 
Many free, open source and commercial backup packages exist; such a utility is also 
bundled with Microsoft Windows [14]. The intuitive assumption is that backup software 
should be able to copy and subsequently if needed to restore full information from a 
storage device. This assumption is however incorrect. If the option to create a full copy 
is selected, various free and commercial file backup tools behave differently when 
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handling structures unique to the NTFS file system. Specifically, files and folders with 
ADS (see Appendix G p.450) are not handled uniformly. Some backup tools are non-
ADS aware, some are able to handle ADS only when both source and target media are 
NTFS formatted, and some can backup full ADS contents to a non-NTFS media and 
later restore it, but only if a target is NTFS formatted 14. 
The following observations are of crucial importance from a computer forensics 
investigations point of view: 
• When a backup is created and stored on non-NTFS formatted media, only some 
tools are able to backup the ADS part of the NTFS file structure. 
• Backup software very rarely offers the option of extracting and separating the 
ADS part of the structure. 
• Backup reporting logs are aimed at the system administrator, and typically are of 
limited forensics value. 
No currently available backup software can be considered to be fully ADS compatible 
and no such software can produce comprehensive reports required by computer 
forensic investigators. As system backups can be produced with a wide variety of tools a 
computer investigator needs to be aware of their peculiarities. It is unavoidable that 
some information may be irretrievably lost, and it is unrealistic to expect that a 
computer forensics tool may be created to fully automate the process of handling 
forensic investigations of backups.  
 
                                                 
14 Appendix G proposes a formal classification of backup software into five groups: Class 0 – Class 4. 
The class allocated depends on how a software package handles ADS. 
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4.3 Live Investigations of NTFS File System Encrypted Data 
For millennia obfuscating information and hiding it by various means was common, and 
the growth of computing only strengthened the demand for more sophisticated and 
easier to use methods [82]. Hiding data using the ADS property of the NTFS file system 
requires certain knowledge of the system’s operation and special tools. With Windows 
2000 Microsoft introduced an easier to use data hiding mechanism: Encrypting File 
System (EFS).  The EFS is the NTFS specific technique to encrypt data which does not 
require an in-depth knowledge of computers, and it can be used even by an 
inexperienced user by simply selecting a box in the Properties menu of a file [54]. 
Encryption and decryption is handled by the system transparently, and a user handles 
the encrypted files in the same manner as clear text files [101].  
The EFS runs as an integrated system service [26], using symmetric key encryption and 
public key technology [92]. The mechanism of protecting data by four layers of 
encryption (see Appendix H p.148) does not allow automated decrypting of data if it is 
copied to another Windows system. Subsequently, the EFS functionality is provided 
locally and only for NTFS local media. 
The above mechanism has two crucial implications in the contents of computer 
forensics: 
• When the owner of a system is logged on, copying an EFS file to a different file 
system, for example FAT32, saves it on the target as clear text. 
• A forensic image of the NTFS disk contains EFS encrypted files which are 
practically impossible to decrypt, thus once the system has been powered off, 
information contained in the encrypted files is irretrievable [3]. 
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The above observations led to the development of a new, forensically sound 
methodology (see Appendix H p.149 and Figure 4.1 ) to extract the EFS encrypted files 
from live systems. The methodology is based on further observation that the only 
window of opportunity to capture the EFS encrypted files in clear text is to copy those 
files to non-NTFS storage when access to a live system is still available. If files are 
copied from a NTFS file system to a FAT32 file system the encryption is not carried 
across, and the files are stored on the FAT32 media in clear text. To assure that 
potential evidence is not changed by the process, software tools used should not require 
installation on the system being analysed. All software utilities are prepared and tested in 
advance and stored on a transportable disk drive which is connected to the investigated 
computer. No tools from the investigated system are used as they may be compromised, 
for example by a rootkit [148], and may trigger an unexpected response or even damage 
the system and invalidate the collected material [91]. 
The investigator working in a live computing environment needs to be aware of the 
Locard’s Exchange Principle, well known to all crime investigators [49]: “Anyone or 
anything entering a crime scene takes something of the scene with them, or leaves something of themselves 
behind when they depart” [128]. Following the Locard’s Principle requires making minimal 
changes to a live system being investigated. The forensic soundness of the methodology 
was proved by verifying that the hash signatures of all EFS encrypted files were not 
changed as a result of copying them to a external USB disk. The one way hash function 
is commonly accepted as a unique fingerprint identifying a file; if the hash signature of a 
file made at different points of time is identical, the file was not altered [130]. 
The methodology of extracting EFS encrypted files as clear text demonstrates that no 
single technique can guarantee successful acquisition of all data from a system being 
analysed – all techniques complement each other. For example acquiring and analysing 
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the physical RAM memory [31] is not sufficient to extract the EFS encrypted files. 
While the memory image may contain encryption keys in clear text, they are a random 
combination of characters, and identifying them cannot be guaranteed, unless their 
location and length are known. An additional difficulty when analysing contents of 
memory is that RAM contents is dynamically changing, and only data in active use at the 
time of memory image acquisition or shortly before can be acquired (see Appendix C 
p.68). 
Demonstrating that it is possible to extract the EFS encrypted files from live systems 
while preserving the original data presents a very strong argument for accepting live 
system techniques as indispensable to complete forensic analysis of a system. 
 
4.4 Summary of Contributions 
This chapter makes a significant contribution to research into formalisation of methods 
for data collection and analysis in NTFS. The findings presented here enhanced the 
current status of computer forensics as a formal discipline of science. 
NTFS is complex and by far the most common file system with unique properties, 
considerable flexibility, and many ways to hide data. Many software utilities exist which 
allow the internal investigation of an NTFS file system, but unfortunately they are not 
particularly suitable as tools for computer forensic investigators. They require a high 
level of understanding of system operation, and their use is time consuming, in turn 
decreasing the effectiveness of the discovery process. 
The major contribution of the research presented here is that it developed formalised 
methods that can be used to hide data in the NTFS file system, and the techniques that 
can be applied to detect and recover the hidden data (see Appendix F).  
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As an exemplar of this methodology, a number of system backup utilities were 
examined and the backup software capability to save and restore Alternate Data Streams 
(ADS) was analysed. Depending on ADS awareness it was proposed to classify such 
software into five classes, Class 0 to Class 4 (see Appendix G). For a computer forensic 
investigator it is crucial to be aware of which class of backup is being analysed, as 
different classes retain varying amounts of information about ADS during backup and 
restore, and often lose data. A safe methodology was designed for handling backups in 
order to avoid the information loss, which is relevant in forensic and general cases. 
A full understanding of the mechanism of hiding and extracting hidden data resulted in 
creating a methodology of extraction for EFS (Encrypted File System) files. A 
comprehensive, formalised procedure for extracting the EFS encrypted files in a 
forensically sound way was created and described (see Appendix H). It was 
demonstrated that working with a live system allows the investigator to extract 
information which cannot be discovered using any other known forensic technique. 
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5 Virtual Environments: New Technologies For 
Forensic Investigation 
(the corresponding research work has been presented in Appendices I to K) 
The computer forensics investigative process comprises a number of steps which are 
very similar to investigative methodologies used in other rigorous, non-computer related 
crime investigations [113]. What makes computer forensis unique is that it requires in-
depth knowledge of many topics belonging to what could be very broadly described as a 
field of computing; tools and methods may come from various, sometimes apparently 
unrelated areas, for example virtual systems 15. 
The stages of the computer forensics investigative process varies in details between 
jurisdictions, however the main steps are relevant universally (see Appendix I p.2). The 
nature of computer crime and to a large extent the legal responses to it are similar 
around the world. Each local jurisdiction is guided by different detailed rules and 
mechanisms, however the conventional computer forensics process can be encapsulated 
in four key phases [85]: access, acquire, analyse and report. Each of these four phases 
can be further subdivided and formalised, for example [91] by observing that the 
methodology has to include a pre-incident preparation stage, detection of incidents, an 
initial response, formulation of response strategy, investigation of the incident, 
reporting, and resolution. A new, enhanced workflow based on virtual environments 
(see Appendix I p.4) has been proposed, and is described in the next sections. 
As the complexity of computing applications grows, there is an increased 
misunderstanding of what computers really are and what they are capable of [141]. In 
the last phase of computer forensic investigations the investigator may be called to 
                                                 
15 Virtualisation is understood here as a simulation of the computer in the virtual environment created 
by the underlying hardware and software. 
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present the results to a non-technical audience. This is a difficult task, as highly skilled 
technicians often have poor skills of communicating their findings in a clear, easy to 
understand way. The problem was summarised by the U.S. Department of Justice [64]: 
“Some judges, attorneys, and jurors may harbor doubts about the reliability and significance of digital 
evidence. To prevent misunderstandings at trial, concepts must be explained in simple terms with 
carefully selected analogies and visual aids”. 
Virtualisation [135] is one tool which can help to analyse the computer  related evidence, 
and assist in presenting the findings in a court environment. 
 
5.1 Forensic Image in a Virtual Environment 
Typically in the process of evidence acquisition a full bit by bit image of the investigated 
system is made using Linux dd [35], or a functionally similar tool.  If the imaged disk 
contains a full operating system, booting it to analyse the user activity and contents of 
the system appears to be a reasonable approach, and is often recommended [111]. 
Usually the original machine is not available, thus moving the acquired image to a 
forensic workstation for analysis and booting it as a guest under virtual machine is the 
next logical step. Indeed, if an investigator succeeded in booting the acquired system on 
his workstation he would be able to see exactly what the original owner saw, and by 
using their tools they would be able to analyse the system. Unfortunately while 
conceptually simple, there are many problems with this approach (see Appendix I p.3). 
Most computer forensics investigators deal with Windows operating systems, simply 
because it is the most commercially successful computing platform [27]. Let us consider 
a case when the original machine being investigated runs a Windows operating system. 
As a anti-piracy measure Microsoft over the years implemented system level 
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mechanisms which prevent copying of the full operating system between different 
computers [99]. From the computer forensics point of view this means that the system 
could be easily booted only on hardware identical to the hardware it was originally 
acquired from, which is impractical. Attempts to boot on different hardware creates a 
series of issues, the severity of which depend on what differences Windows will detect. 
If they are relatively small, Windows may request new hardware drivers to be installed. 
If the differences are considerable, for example different CPU architectures, Windows 
will fail to boot and generate a kernel-level error. 
Similar problems exist when attempting to boot the system in a virtual machine 
environment. Virtual machines emulate a very limited range of hardware; they were not 
created to duplicate a wide variety of possible hardware configurations. An additional 
problem arises because of Microsoft Product Activation policy [100] built into all 
versions of Windows. Microsoft uses different activation approaches for computers 
released by manufacturers (Original Equipment Manufacturer, or OEM), purchased in a 
retail store, or volume licensed by enterprise customers. 
For a computer forensics investigator moving a full system to different hardware creates 
a difficult to solve problem. As a result of the product activation mechanism the image 
may simply fail to boot on different hardware. 
During the product activation Windows checks ten areas of the computer system and 
creates an eight byte long hash number corresponding to the configuration.  The check 
uses only some selected hardware components, such as a part of the CPU serial number, 
IDE and SCSI adapters, ‘dockable’ flag, BIOS ID, etc. The resulting eight byte hardware 
hash value and Windows serial number are used by Microsoft to activate Windows 
online or on the phone. Once the installation has been activated, on each login 
Windows checks that the hardware is similar to the hardware that it was activated on; if 
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the hardware is detected as “substantially different”, reactivation is required.  The 
precise algorithm used to determine when the hardware is “substantially” different as 
opposed to “the same or similar” is not published by Microsoft for obvious reasons. 
The above mechanism allows users to replace some computer components without 
being forced to reactivate the installation, for example video adapters can be changed to 
a different brand and type. If the motherboard is changed to a new type with a different 
BIOS and different integrated components this would unfortunately cause Windows to 
create sufficiently different hardware hash error requiring reactivation. This means that a 
computer forensics technician can not be certain what will happen when the image is 
transferred to different hardware and a boot is attempted – while it may sometimes 
work, often it will fail, and thus it can not be recommended as a formalised procedure. 
If an image is booted on the same hardware as the hardware that it was acquired from 
Windows is still accessing many files during the boot process. For example during a 
normal, error free boot the Windows NT system accesses over 500 files, changing their 
contents and time stamps [85]. 
If an image is booted on different hardware Windows will request a series of new 
drivers to be installed thus making even more changes to the original image. While other 
operating systems (for example Linux) typically allow movement of the system image 
between machines without protections similar to Microsoft activation policy, it still 
requires a series of drivers when booted on a different (real or virtual) platform. In 
effect the forensic soundness of such an approach is questionable due to considerable 
changes to the original image, and may possibly render the results as being inadmissible 
in court. It definitely clashes with the fundamental rule of forensis requiring “minimal 
handling of the original” [95]. 
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While booting of the forensic image in a virtual machine environment is a conceptually 
attractive option, in reality it can not be fully trusted as a reliable and easy to duplicate 
methodology. If the booting fails, or does not bring expected results a different 
approach is called for, as described in the next section.  
 
5.2 Using Virtualisation to Improve the Analysis Process 
In forensis there is always a danger of incorrect handling of the acquired materials which 
in turn can invalidate the whole process of forensis. The Australian Institute of 
Criminology guide [95] recommends two rules for the process of analysing computer 
evidence: “minimal handling of the original” and “do not exceed your knowledge”. This 
requires careful handling of the evidence, formalising and documenting all steps, and 
consulting a more experienced specialist if and when required – such an approach 
makes the process slow. At the same time there always existed a conflicting expectation 
to produce some tangible result within reasonable time [150], [149]. 
Using the best tool for a given task is of paramount importance in the computer 
forensics field, where the investigator has to handle a wider range of issues than in any 
other computer related field. In the process of investigating an incident it is not unusual 
to look into mechanisms of various operating systems, hardware ranging from small 
devices to large servers, distributed data storage, networks, etc. [146]. No software tool 
is perfect and universal, and some tools are more suitable for some tasks – for example 
it is well known that Linux based tools are generally better suited to handle network 
related investigations [53], while investigating the internal structure of NTFS file system 
is better handled by Windows based tools [38]. 
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However it should be stressed that a simple methodology based on using Linux tools to 
analyse one type of data (for example network activity traces) and to use Windows based 
tools to analyse a different set of data (for example NTFS structures) is not necessarily 
correct in every specific case. Which tool (and which operating system platform) is best 
to handle a specific task depends on the specific tool, the specific task at hand, and the 
individual skill level of the investigator. Both Windows and Linux platforms and tools 
can and should complement each other at all levels [105]. 
Generally, using Linux tools to forensically analyse Linux and Windows images has 
many advantages and is very well documented [61]. At the same time computer 
forensics investigators are much more likely to come with Windows experience, and 
most commercial tools for forensic work are Windows based [111]. To illustrate with 
two examples: the most commonly used set of computer forensics tools is EnCase [30] 
from Guidance Software, and another tool, InfinaDyne’s CD/DVD Inspector [46], is 
the only fully integrated tool to examine and analyse CD and DVD evidence – both are 
Windows based. 
It would be counterproductive to abandon one computing platform in preference to the 
other, none is “the best” for computer forensics work: depending on a specific task at 
hand one of them may be more accurate, faster and easier to use. 
Because of technical complexities and lack of detailed procedures courts often request 
that a finding should be verified using two different tools [137]. It strengthens the 
findings of an investigator if such confirmation of conclusions comes not only from two 
different tools, but from tools used in different operating system environments. 
A methodology has been proposed (see Appendix I p.4) where two (or more) different 
computing environments are used to analyse the same evidence. The selection of 
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specific computing environments depends on the expertise of forensics personnel, the 
specific task at hand, and availability of tools. For one task it may be Sun Solaris and 
Windows 7, for another task it may be Linux Fedora and Windows XP. Because a 
virtual machine environment is used changing computing platform and tools is fast and 
easy, and it can be done using one computer only, provided it is sufficiently powerful 
and properly configured. Using one workstation has an additional benefit of increasing 
security (all work is physically kept on one machine) and simplifies backing up of the 
work. 
An exemplar of this method has been presented as a specific scenario (see Appendix I 
p. 5) where the same disk image can be accessed from two different operating systems 
and different tools can be used depending on a task. Such a setup gives access to a wider 
range of tools, and better flexibility in deciding which tool to use for a specific task. 
Therefore it results in improved accuracy of the computer evidence analysis process, 
and it shortens the total time required for analysis. The following main steps are 
suggested (for the detailed workflow see Appendix I p.4): 
• selected distribution of Linux is installed as host on a investigator computer, and 
preferred virtual machine software is installed and configured on the host, 
• selected Windows editions (XP, Vista, 7, etc.) are installed as guest operating 
systems (one or more guests can be installed as needed), 
• the acquired image is mounted on the Linux host.  
Linux systems always offered an easy method of mounting and dismounting physical 
disks, partitions, folders and storage devices [132], and when a forensic image is 
mounted under a Linux host it is easy to divide it as required into logically separate 
parts, and make such parts available at will to the host Linux, the guest Windows or 
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both, also as read-only mounts [45]. This offers the investigator high flexibility. A single, 
large image can be divided into sections which are logically connected: for example a 
group of folders and files relating to accounting can be temporarily mounted in an 
‘accounting’ folder, a group of folders and files containing games can be mounted as a 
‘games’ folder, etc. When the original image is divided in such a way the investigator can 
concentrate on analysing a series of separate parts, temporarily excluding other parts of 
the image from the process, and thus search and extract data faster.  
The process can be further improved if we assume two investigators (or two teams of 
investigators), less experienced and more experienced, who are allocated to the same 
task of analysing hard disk data (see Appendix I p.4 and Appendix J p.3). This is similar 
to the roles of CNF Technician (Computer and Network Forensic Technician) and 
CNF Professional (Computer and Network Forensic Professional) in the classification 
proposed by Yasinsac et al [159]. Any attempt to boot the image and to initially 
investigate it [120] is done by the less experienced investigator, who can search it for all 
details relevant to the investigation. While such approach is likely to invalidate the 
integrity of the acquired image, this is of no consequence to the investigation. The initial 
findings are passed to the senior investigator, who then uses the original, unmodified 
disk image and proper computer forensics tools and techniques to confirm the findings. 
Such an approach allows the team to use a less qualified person to do a preliminary, less 
rigorous analysis of the evidence which may bring results faster and more efficiently 
without invalidating the final findings. 
Utilising a virtual machine environment has the unique advantage of not irreversibly 
closing avenues of investigations: every investigator working in the Linux host 
environment with Windows running as a guest would still have full access to the familiar 
Windows set of tools. Moreover no technician would be forced to use any environment 
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in preference to another:, every investigator is given a free choice to select any tool on 
any computing platform, and to discover the advantages of new tools. The same disk 
image which is analysed from a Windows guest with Windows based tools is at the same 
time mounted on the Linux host and can be accessed with the native Linux tools. It is 
natural that an investigator in such a parallel Windows/Linux environment would start 
trying tools from another computing platform, and they will benefit from the new, 
powerful utilities and techniques.  
 
5.3 Easing Reliance on Closed Source Software 
Easing reliance on the expensive closed source software is of particular significance 
during the economic downturn of 2009 as shown in the March 2009 International Data 
Corporation (IDC) [4] survey. IDC conducted one of the most comprehensive research 
projects in the area of Linux adoption by large institutions (100 or more employees): 
they collected data from 330 organizations in different countries. The survey [58] 
showed two interesting trends: 
• “the current economic crisis will also have a net positive impact on the use of 
virtualization software” 
• “half of the survey participants stated that moving to virtualization is 
accelerating their adoption of Linux” 
This thesis further supports the IDC findings: it summarises research work conducted 
in the last three years and confirms the soundness of adopting a Linux environment in 
the computer forensics field (Appendix K p.6). Best results are achieved when two 
environments, Linux and Windows, are not used exclusively, but in parallel. 
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Typically in the process of a computer forensic investigation the Windows environment 
and Windows based software tools are used [78]. This reliance on closed source 
software has certain advantages [30] and disadvantages [72], and traditionally created 
two groups of specialists: one working in Windows, another one in Unix/Linux 
environments. 
Computer forensics is one of the areas which clearly demonstrate that to be more 
efficient a new type of specialist is required: one who finds it easy to switch between 
different environments at will. The methodology of using virtual environments 
described above has a significant advantage over the older, conventional approach [39]: 
it eases reliance on closed source (Windows based) tools. The setup does not require 
any drastic change in the existing methodologies: it introduces a parallel, Linux based 
environment and tools which an investigator may use to check or complement the 
findings obtained with Windows tools. 
The specific advantages of using virtual environments in computer forensics application 
are: 
• Cost savings: typically Windows software tools currently used in computer 
forensics investigations cost US$5,000 or more with strict licensing limits – by 
contrast open source tools are free. 
• Skill expansion: if skilled investigators are offered an easy to use dual operating 
system environment, they will start using the best tools from both platforms, 
and soon will expand their skills beyond Windows based tools. This is invaluable 
when the need arises to analyse Linux incidents. 
• Verification of findings: many researchers stress this as a very important 
advantage of open source tools. It is clear that when using closed source tools 
54 
one can not completely prove what was done, to what extent the procedure used 
was forensically non-intrusive, or that the original files were not affected. While 
in most investigations such proof may not be required, in critical cases being 
unable to demonstrate a full understanding of the tool may lead to challenging 
the validity of the findings. 
 
5.4 Summary of Contributions 
An in-depth understanding of two apparently unrelated areas, virtual environments and 
forensis, created a unique perspective which led to using virtualisation for forensis more 
efficiently and accurately. Virtualisation was not created with computer forensis as the 
main application, and while it offers a very powerful set of tools they are aimed mainly 
at server applications [107]. The innovative research presented in Appendices I, J and K 
shows that virtualisation allows for more efficient identification and analysis of the 
evidence, and significantly enhances the clarity of presentation of findings in a 
courtroom situation. 
A new approach was proposed (see Appendix I) where two environments, conventional 
and virtual, are used independently and in parallel. This approach can considerably 
shorten the time of the analysis phase of computer forensics investigation and it also 
allows for better utilisation of less qualified personnel. A specific instance of this 
methodology was presented as a formalised method of analysing USB flash drives in 
virtual environments (see Appendix J). 
An approach was proposed leading to a gradual shift from closed source software tools 
to open source software (OSS) tools. The research (see Appendix K) demonstrates a 
more effective way of using Virtual Machines in Linux environments by complementing 
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the conventional techniques, and providing verifiable results not dependent on the tools 
used. 
The method of using virtualisation to build parallel multi-operating system 
environments proposed in this chapter is ready for commercial application. Many 
robust, stable and free Linux distributions are available, for example openSUSE [8], 
which have virtualisation integrated at the system level. 
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6 Systemising the Computer Forensics Body of  
Knowledge: Tertiary Education 
(the corresponding research work has been presented in Appendices L to O) 
The Encyclopaedia Britannica defines science as “any system of knowledge that is concerned 
with the physical world and its phenomena and that entails unbiased observations and systematic 
experimentation. In general, a science involves a pursuit of knowledge covering general truths or the 
operations of fundamental laws” [1]. There are many studies dedicated to the history and 
philosophy of science [25] leading to a conceptual distinction between what the above 
definition calls “observations and experimentation” and a proper discipline of science. 
The process of a body of knowledge emerging as a science implies progress and gradual, 
consistent elimination of errors in methodology. What follows is replacement of the 
previous assumptions, concepts, and practices with new ones which better approximate 
the truth. 
For a body of knowledge to become a science it not only needs to be unique in nature 
but it also needs to grow in size to achieve impact and legitimacy in the scientific 
community and society at large – see Figure 6.1. Forming a new discipline is a process 
that takes time, a great deal of effort, and participation of many dedicated like-minded 
people. This process does not always succeed: two exemplars of bodies of knowledge 
which emerged as well established areas of science are physics and computer science. 
An exemplar of a discipline which stagnated and failed to develop further is the study of 
formal organisations [23]. A closer examination of the past can provide valuable insight 
into what is needed for computer forensics to succeed and to emerge as a well 
established, distinct discipline of science.  
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Figure 6-1 Computer Forensis – Synergies With Other Disciplines 
 
6.1 Emergence of a Discipline of Science 
Physics is the foundation of all natural sciences, as it is human nature to strive to better 
understand the universe. However for a long time there was no science named 
“physics”; this term appeared in the English language only in the 19th century during the 
second scientific revolution. Physics was not universally recognised as a discipline of 
science for a long time [69]; it took many years for the scientific community and society 
at large to embrace and accept it [25]. There are numerous examples of physicists who 
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were not called by that name by their contemporaries. For example Newton who lived 
in the 17th century was not called a “physicist” in his time. Indeed, what is today 
acknowledged as physics often has roots in discoveries which can be traced back 
thousands of years: for example the Chinese made simple magnets from lodestone and 
used them for navigation as early as 2700BC [71].  
Another example of a well established although much younger discipline is computer 
science (see also Figure 1-1 in the Introduction chapter). The first electronic computers 
appeared around the late 1940s as specialised scientific instruments used mainly in 
military applications, and slowly developed into commercial machinery for business 
applications. Around the 1970s computers moved into homes and became known as 
“personal computers” or PCs, and finally around the mid 1980s networking and later 
the Internet became common [40]. In the early 1940s Thomas J Watson [154], then the 
president of IBM, was known to say: "there is a world market for about five computers" 
[123]. Should his prediction have proved to be correct it is unlikely that computing 
would become the distinct discipline of science it is today. 
Mechanical calculating instruments (such as the abacus) existed since antiquity in 
different forms in all ancient civilisations [158]. It is uncertain when the body of 
knowledge relating to computing became computer science, but it appears to have 
happened around the late 1950s when electronic calculating machines became more 
common. However even in the 1950s it was not clear that computing machinery 
required its own,  new discipline of science. Many considered it to be a part of electrical 
engineering or mathematics, and in some countries during the early period of computer 
development people referred to computers as “mathematical machines” [124].  
Not every body of knowledge succeeds to become science: one such example is the 
study of formal organisations which started in the mid-1960s as studies of formal 
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structures and social mechanisms of large organisations. Substantial research [131] was 
conducted in the area of interrelation of organisational complexities, rules, levels of 
authority, etc. The work was carried by strong research groups located in the USA and 
Great Britain till the late 1970s, but by the 1980s the field was left abandoned and 
almost no new research had been published in professional journals. The work done in 
this field was not wasted: it is still being quoted in textbooks [144], and occasionally a 
new study is being published [144]. However depending on the aspect of an 
organisation being analysed and focused on, the study can be considered to be a part of 
psychology [68], sociology [66] or business management [129]. Formal organisations 
studies failed to establish itself as a separate discipline of science and eventually became 
marginalised  because the field never achieved impact, and it “lost connection to the larger 
issues which had generated the original questions” [160]. This is not to suggest that the body of 
knowledge became irrelevant or forgotten: the field simply never reached sufficient 
momentum and support at large to grow and separate itself from other disciplines. 
The above examples are separated by 200 years, yet they demonstrate surprisingly 
similar mechanisms which are at work. Physics and computing were disciplines unique 
and fundamental in nature, relevant to current issues, and of interest to sufficiently large 
groups of people to influence and impact society. They both succeeded and emerged as 
separate disciplines of science, while formal organisations studies failed to do so. 
However during each of their formative years the ultimate outcome was far from 
obvious. 
Any body of knowledge needs to build a critical mass and wide acceptance. While 
technological progress, enthusiasm and a level of commitment from the participants are 
the necessary starting point to create the momentum, they may not be sufficient. If the 
research work and publications focus only on technical aspects, the transition from a 
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body of knowledge to a discipline of science may never occur, as demonstrated on the 
example of study of formal organisations. 
Because of its cross disciplinary nature computer forensics needs to base its progress on 
a multiplicity of concepts from different fields– see Figure 6.1 . An expansion of the 
science base requires not only contributions with technical contents, but also an influx 
of research work and publications providing a conceptual platform for establishing a 
new paradigm for future researchers. The group of people who practice the discipline 
professionally needs to grow to strengthen its position, and students leaving higher 
education institutions need to see computer forensics as a viable and attractive career 
path. People starting their professional career are often uncertain as to which specific 
area of science or technology to enter. It makes their decisions easier if they were 
provided with the highest quality of education [102]; often it may even show them new 
directions they did not know existed. However for the body of knowledge to succeed in 
becoming a part of the tertiary curriculum it has to be formalised and systemised [80].  
6.2 Computer Forensics Education 
The study of the current computer forensics education in Australian tertiary institutions 
(see Appendix L p.1383) led to the systemisation of approaches to teaching in this field.  
The first computer forensics subject was offered by the Edith Cowan University (ECU) 
in 2003, and the ECU continues to provide a comprehensive range of computer 
forensics degrees at all levels [52]. Currently around six other universities offer various 
subjects in computer forensics, but there is a lack of a unified approach: unlike other 
fields of computer science, no guidelines or recommendations exist for computer 
forensics curricula. 
The computer forensics specialisation for the Bachelor of Computer Science degree at 
the University of Western Sydney (UWS) was designed in 2005, first offered in 2006, 
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and is current as of 2009 [13]. Introduction of the computer forensics specialisation for 
the Bachelor of Computer Science degree at the School of Computing and Mathematics 
(SCM) provided further impetus to formally systemise the computer forensics body of 
knowledge. 
In very broad terms computer forensics investigators belong to one of two groups [44]: 
one group are people trained to use specific tools, the other group are people who 
possess a good understanding of hardware, software and computing. Obviously any 
investigator should have some experience with commercial tools and good 
understanding of computers; these do not have to be mutually exclusive. All academics 
involved in developing the curriculum agreed that for a computer science student who 
gained a good understanding of various aspects of computing it is less important to be 
familiar with a specific commercial package, and more important to understand how a 
specific tool works and why it should be selected for a specific task. This methodology 
leans in a natural way towards open source tools, which are usually more difficult to use 
by someone with a shallow understanding of computing. However these tools offer 
excellent results and unprecedented power in the hands of a person who understands 
what they do, and how they do it. 
The exemplar of the proposed methodology was the development of the curriculum for 
the computer forensics specialisation for the Bachelor of Computer Science degree at 
UWS is presented in Appendix N (see p. 16). The curriculum development was based to 
a large extent on research and professional experience in the related fields of the 
academics involved. A few textbooks were recommended as general reading and 
reference materials, but it was stressed that they will not be followed chapter by chapter 
during the delivery of the subject. 
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The subject delivery was based on current research work and recent materials collected 
from numerous sources. While some commercial tools were occasionally used during 
lectures and laboratories, the majority of tools used were free and open source (see 
Appendix M p.31). The student feedback during the subject delivery and from the 
anonymous end-of-session questionnaires confirmed the full success of this approach 
(see Appendix M p.32). 
All experiences and the lessons learned during the design and delivery of the subject 
were clearly described for anyone interested to continue improving it (see Appendix M 
p.30). The effort has been already acknowledged internationally thus significantly 
contributing to building up the overall momentum of the discipline. Each year each 
student completing the Computer Forensics major increases the number of 
professionals who either work in the area of computer forensics, or draw on their 
knowledge of this field in their work.  
Higher education students and professionals working in various computer related areas 
are often not aware of the discipline of computer forensics, and how it can benefit their 
work. To evoke their interest it is necessary to offer them access to tools which are 
readily available and thus encourage experimentation. Commercial tools are not the best 
choice for this purpose because of the cost involved: they address the need of specialist 
market, where the price of a tool is of little concern (for example the law enforcing 
agencies). A single software package can easily cost around US$5,000 or even more [2]. 
Our research demonstrated (see Appendix N p.209) that in many cases access to 
expensive commercial software is not necessary, as the same results can be achieved 
with free or open source software [138] 16. 
                                                 
16 For the purpose of this work it is only relevant to make a distinction between two broad categories 
of software licensing: no cost and commercial. No cost category is referred to as “free or open 
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To demonstrate the benefits of employing non-commercial software tools in computer 
forensics an innovative approach was proposed where two parallel environments in a 
virtual machine configuration allow switching between commercial software tools and 
free open source tools. This approach provides a valuable verification of results 
obtained when analysing the same problem in two different environments. Specific 
examples were provided to encourage experimentation amongst students as well as 
professionals. Many of them would not be able to duplicate the suggested hardware and 
software configuration and extend the experiments in the directions suggested if it 
required expensive software. The experimental configuration suggested offers a unique 
advantage of comparing what can be achieved in different Windows and Linux 
environments, and determining which tools are best suited for a given task. Such an 
approach creates a mechanism encouraging the use of both Windows and Linux 
environments for the same task, and subsequently expands the skills and expertise of 
personnel in a natural way. At the same time working in a dual operating system 
environment does not force an investigator more familiar with Windows to abandon the 
environment they feel more comfortable, allowing them to see what are the advantages 
of a Linux based tool. Finally, less common operating system environments can also be 
used, for example Sun Solaris which offers a somewhat different virtualisation 
environment with unique computer forensics capabilities [155]. 
 
6.3 Computer Forensics in Foundation Studies 
For a field of knowledge to achieve the critical mass needed to transform it into a 
discipline of science it is not sufficient to operate only in the realm of academia, even if 
                                                                                                                                          
source”, which is also known as F/OSS, FOSS, or FLOSS (free/libre/open source). It should be noted 
that there are many licensing schemes for open source software, for example GNU General Public 
License (GPL), GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL), Affero General Public License (GNU 
AGPL), The Mozilla Public License, etc.  
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the researchers and academics working in the field are talented and committed to make 
their vision a reality. The discipline also needs to make an impact amongst the public at 
large, for example by introducing its basic principles to a broad range of higher 
education level students. 
An excellent opportunity to reach students with no assumed technical skills or 
knowledge is PC Workshop, an introductory computing subject offered by the SCM as 
an open elective. The subject was not used to teach the students how to use computer 
forensics tools, but to make them aware that such a field exists and to expose them to a 
few general concepts specific to this field.  
PC Workshop aims to guide the students towards becoming power users of computers 
by giving them the ability to explore, learn, and solve problems they will face in the 
future when using personal computers. There is a growing trend in educational 
institutions at all levels to offer introductory computing courses to every student, even 
those enrolled for non-technical degrees. Academics realise that computers are tools 
commonly used in practically all disciplines, and thus relevancy and importance of 
computer literacy for every educated person is unquestionable [121]. 
There are many educational institutions which changed their curricula to reflect this 
view, for example Georgia Institute of Technology, USA, in 1999 adopted a 
requirement that all students must take a introductory computing course [62]. It is 
reasonable to assume that this is a growing trend, and more introductory computing 
courses are being designed to reach students at all levels. 
PC Workshop was a case study to prove and demonstrate that selected concepts of 
computer forensis can be successfully taught to students with no previous exposure to 
advanced computing concepts (see Appendix O p.6). When designing the subject two 
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basic approaches were considered: traditional, or content-based teaching, and the 
exploratory learning technique. 
Content-based teaching is still the most common teaching technique; it places heavy 
emphasis on lecturing, and leaves very little flexibility for experimenting beyond 
prescribed activities. There are two disadvantages of this approach. Firstly there are no 
introductory personal computing textbooks which include computer forensics concepts. 
Secondly while the content-based, structured approach has educational advantages in 
certain fields (for example introductory mathematics subjects) it is a poor choice as a 
method of introducing new concepts which students can discover themselves by 
experimenting. 
In designing the PC Workshop we adopted the exploratory learning technique, which is 
still not used commonly in university undergraduate courses. The textbook adopted was 
a comprehensive and well illustrated book which explains basic concepts of all aspects 
of computing [16], but not surprisingly it does not mention computer forensics. PC 
Workshop was designed with heavy emphasis on practical laboratory exercises. During 
the laboratories the students were encouraged to discover and learn by experimenting 
beyond the tasks described in the laboratory work sheets, and to explore new areas 
leading to the realisation that there is always more beyond the obvious. This approach 
gave us the opportunity to successfully introduce selected concepts and techniques 
inherent to computer forensics, for example multi partitioning of a hard disk drive or 
data recovery techniques. Such concepts are usually considered to be advanced and are 
rarely included in entry level computing courses. The students responded very well and 
with curiosity when exposed to new, unorthodox topics not covered in standard 
introductory texts. This approach succeeded, and the students left with a general 
understanding of the concepts of computer forensics and the ability to apply them in 
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their professional field. Another step towards strengthening the position of computer 
forensics as a discipline of science was achieved. 
 
6.4 Summary of Contributions 
This chapter makes a significant contribution to the design, development and 
implementation of computer forensics curricula at the tertiary level. Sharing knowledge 
and improving educational techniques is the best mechanism to create an influx of new 
researchers and practitioners, and in turn to sustain the momentum of progress which 
can transform the body of knowledge and practices into a discipline of science. 
To systemise how teaching is conducted an overview of current computer forensics 
education in Australian tertiary institutions has been performed (see Appendix L). We 
also discussed the position of computer forensics in the body of knowledge and the 
issues of curriculum development, including the involvement of professional societies. 
Research into higher degree teaching methodologies was applied in practice to create 
successful computer forensics curricula for university level computer subject, Computer 
Forensics Workshop (see Appendix M). The subject was developed and delivered 
repeatedly over the years with full success and a consistently very high level of student 
satisfaction17. The project fully succeeded, and the experience gained teaching computer 
forensics at the tertiary level and the lessons learned in the process were shared with the 
international academic community through publishing our findings and through 
extensive personal contacts. 
 A significant contribution was made by researching the application of open source 
software tools in computer forensics education at the tertiary level. The argument was 
                                                 
17 As measured by the UWS anonymous student surveys. 
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put forward that open source tools are more suitable in education than commercial 
tools, as they provide the opportunity for students to gain an in-depth understanding 
and appreciation of the computer forensic process as opposed to familiarity with one 
software product. A comprehensive case study was presented to illustrate this point (see 
Appendix N). 
A contribution was made to advance the recognition of computer forensics as a field of 
science by introducing its basic concepts to a broader audience. By analysing the design 
and delivery of “PC Workshop” as another case study, we demonstrated that selected 
concepts of computer forensis can be taught to students at the introductory level (see 
Appendix O). 
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7 Summary of  Contributions and Future Work 
 
This thesis makes a material contribution to strengthening and advancing the position of 
computer forensis as a discipline of science by: 
• presenting a comprehensive overview of its history, 
• identifying new areas crucial to further development of the discipline, 
• developing a series of new methodologies and providing exemplars illustrating 
new approaches, 
• designing, developing and implementing computer forensics curricula at the 
tertiary level.  
Chapter 2 of the thesis (see Appendices A, B, C, D and E) contributes significantly to 
the discipline of computer forensis by presenting a comprehensive analysis of the 
emergence of computer forensics, setting current research directions and identifying 
future challenges. Today it is easy to maintain a Web site located beyond local 
jurisdiction [59], to use free and powerful data encryption tools [145] or to use 
practically unlimited on-line storage [5] located in a remote place. None of those 
technologies existed when the discipline of computer forensics was formed, and the 
challenge for the discipline is to understand the latest developments in the computer 
field, and to anticipate how they can be used by lawbreakers (see Appendix A). 
The analysis concludes that computer technology reached a stage when the 
conventional, mechanistic approach to collecting and analysing data is no longer 
sufficient. Two areas crucial to further development of the discipline were identified: 
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technical (memory forensics – see Appendices B and C) and organisational (computer 
forensis vs. information security (IS) audit— see Appendices D and E). 
The thesis presents methodology quantifying persistence of user data in physical 
computer memory (see Appendix C p.70), and proposes a new technique which allows 
for forensically sound acquisition of memory based on the persistence paradigm (see 
Appendix B p.134). Research into similarities and differences between computer 
forensics and IS audit (see Appendix E p.113) resulted in developing a hybrid 
methodology which ensures that the evidence found in the course of an IS audit is 
forensically sound (see Appendix D p.7). 
Chapter 3 of the thesis (see Appendices F, G and H) proves that there is very little 
finalised, and a lot still to be discovered in the conventional computer forensics 
methodology. As an example, the new NTFS file format system introduced many 
peculiarities and issues which had to be urgently addressed by computer forensic 
investigators. The thesis makes an important contribution to a better understanding of 
the internal NTFS mechanisms. 
A formalised methodology for hiding data in the NTFS file system and the techniques 
to detect and recover hidden data has been described (see Appendix F p.118). An 
exemplar of this methodology was proposed where the system backup software was 
tested and, depending on its capability to save and restore NTFS Alternate Data 
Streams, was classified as belonging to one of five classes (see Appendix G p.450).  A 
new methodology for extraction of EFS (Encrypted File System) files (see Appendix H 
p.3) was presented, and an exemplar of formalised procedures for extracting EFS 
encrypted files from live systems in a forensically sound way was described (see 
Appendix H p.5). 
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Chapter 4 of the thesis (see Appendices I, J and K) describes innovative research 
connecting virtualisation (which is aimed mainly at server applications) and forensis. A 
methodology reducing the time of the analysis phase of computer forensics 
investigation was developed (see Appendix I p.3) where conventional and virtual 
computing environments are used in parallel. Formalised exemplars of analysing a hard 
disk images (see Appendix I p.5) and USB flash drives in virtual environments (see 
Appendix J p.3) were presented. 
As a result of extensive research experience with free and open source tools an 
approach was proposed leading to a gradual shift from closed source software tools to 
open source software (OSS) tools in computer forensics investigations (see Appendix K 
p.3) An exemplar case was presented which demonstrates a strong advantage of using a 
dual Windows / Linux virtual environment to access disk images with different 
operating systems (see Appendix K p.6). 
Chapter 5 of the thesis (see Appendices L, M, N and O) makes a pioneering 
contribution to the methodology of computer forensics tertiary education by creating 
curricula and describing in detail the design and development of the Computer 
Forensics Workshop subject. In order to systemise how teaching is conducted a 
comprehensive overview of current computer forensics education in Australian tertiary 
institutions had been performed (see Appendix L p.1386), contributing to a better 
understanding of the position of computer forensics in the body of knowledge. 
Computer Forensics Workshop (see Appendix M p.29) is an exemplar of suitable 
teaching methodologies for creating a comprehensive computer forensics curriculum 
for a university level computer subject. The subject was delivered repeatedly over the 
years with full success and a consistently very high level of student satisfaction (see 
Appendix M p.32). The actual application of open source software tools in computer 
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forensics education at the tertiary level led to the conclusion that such tools provide a 
better opportunity for students to gain an in-depth understanding and appreciation of 
the computer forensic process as opposed to familiarity with one software product (see 
Appendix N p.15). 
Finally, a significant contribution was made to advance the recognition of computer 
forensics by introducing its basic concepts to a broader audience. Selected concepts of 
computer forensis were included in the curricula designed to teach students in PC 
Workshop, an introductory level subject (see Appendix O p.10). 
Further research is needed in all areas of computer forensis. The recent realisation that 
the data which a computer investigator intends to capture is often dynamic and volatile 
(see Chapter 3) has led to increased interest in live system investigations, and 
subsequently created a need to develop better tools for live system memory capture and 
analysis. While various software products already exist they are mostly command line 
based, experimental or proof of concept, and are not ready for forensic investigation 
work. 
More work is needed in the area of IS audit and computer forensics to better 
understand the common requirements of both fields and to develop common 
approaches and more mature tools. A hybrid methodology combining computer 
forensics and computer audit tools needs further refinement and more exemplars. 
New, recently introduced file systems are complex and full documentation of their 
internals is not readily available. Furthermore their metadata structures provide an 
almost unlimited scope for hiding information (see Chapter 4). The body of research 
presented in the thesis is a foundation for creating an easy to use software tool which 
could comprehensively scan NTFS structures for hidden data. However the 
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methodologies rely on command line tools, for example Robocopy [10]. An unavoidable 
danger when using such tools is that selecting an incorrect parameter may result in 
damaging or invalidating all the evidence being collected. To minimise the chance of 
errors and make the tools suitable for use by investigating technicians all procedures 
should be at least partly automated by preparing a series of scripts which reduce the 
chance of entering wrong parameters. These procedure should preferably be based on 
improved graphics interfaces [86]. Collecting selected utilities and creating one toolkit 
with a simple to use graphics interface would help less experienced investigators to 
acquire the evidence from a live system in a reliable and efficient manner. 
Virtualisation is a rapidly maturing technology which was not created for the computer 
forensics field, but it has tremendous potential in helping to analyse the computer 
related evidence and assisting in presenting the findings in a court environment (see 
Chapter 5). There is a large community of computer forensics investigators, thus virtual 
machine configurations should be further developed and specifically tailored for unique 
computer forensics needs. More work is also required to create exemplars of complete 
environments to demonstrate the accuracy and time saving advantages of dual Windows 
/ Linux platforms when used as tools of forensis.  
Further research is required into specific requirements and techniques of booting a 
forensic image in a virtual environment. This appears to be a very attractive application 
of virtualisation, but at this stage a lot of work would be required to make the process 
reliable and universally applicable to a wide range of computer configurations an 
investigator may encounter. Work done by Carnegie Mellon University resulted in the 
release of the Live View software tool [6] which creates a VMware virtual machine out 
of raw disk images. However the tool still fails to work in some cases and its application 
in professional investigations is somewhat limited at best. 
73 
Work also needs to continue in the field of education (see Chapter 6). Each year brings 
new technological developments and teaching a university level course in a new growing 
discipline has to be based on continuously updated curricula. The curriculum developed 
for this purpose would soon become obsolete unless scholarship and research is 
continued [94]. At the same time there is also an almost unlimited scope to use 
computer forensics techniques illustrated with various practical examples when teaching 
introductory level computing subjects to undergraduate students. 
Computer forensics is impacting not only academics and researchers, but also the 
general public. All organisations and individuals intuitively accept that the security of 
their computers or computer networks is not infallible, and when it fails computer 
forensis is indispensable to determine how the system was compromised [97]. A large 
and growing community of professional investigators are continuously updating their 
knowledge and have a keen interest in specific solutions based on scenarios likely to 
occur in their daily practice. Organisations are also keen to know how to increase the 
protection of their computer networks in the future. For this reason the significance and 
pervasiveness of computer forensis continues to grow, and its universal importance can 
not be overestimated. 
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